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I. INTRODUCTION
The Writers Guild (“WGA”) and Directors Guild (“DGA”) of America
formed in the early twentieth century to empower writers and directors in
Hollywood.1 These “craft unions” unified workers that belonged to the same
craft rather than the same employer.2 A common issue that these
entertainment laborers faced at the hands of the major studios3 was the
misappropriation of credit for their work on films.4 Before the WGA, studios
would sometimes either give credit to the most favored writer or a significant
other rather than the individuals that wrote a film (a common grievance of
writers in the WGA)5 or give credit to multiple directors rather than one (a
common grievance of directors in the DGA).6 Moreover, credits became
extremely important to writers and directors not only for legacy and
networking in the industry,7 but also to obtain residual payments from films.8
When a writer in the WGA does not initially receive credit when they believe
they should, they may initiate a credit arbitration.9 The arbiters to this
proceeding are a panel of three anonymous writers, and they determine
whether the writer disputing credit has written enough to surpass a threshold
to receive credit from the studio. 10 The DGA does not share this system in
common with the WGA; when there is a dispute of credits among directors,
the studio must notify the DGA and negotiate the credit.11 These director
credit disputes do not arise often as the DGA is clear that only a single
director or occasionally an approved two-director team is permitted to
receive the credit of “director” in a given film.12 However, as studios face
complex directors’ credit issues (as in cases of public outrage over a
director’s scandals, an unrecognized directing team, etc.) the informal
negotiation in place for directors’ credit dispute may prove insufficient to
address the complexities of a director’s attribution. In fact, the remedy to
these issues in the past has been for a given director to outright leave the
1. VIRGINIA WRIGHT WEXMAN, HOLLYWOOD’S ARTISTS:
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 13-14 (2020) (ebook).

THE DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA

2. Michael L. Zimmer, Taking on An Industry: Women and Directing in Hollywood, 20 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 229, 250 (2016).
3. While the term “studio” will be used throughout the paper, “studio” should be taken to mean
“signatory Company” as the WGA designates in its collective bargaining agreement, and “Employer” in
the DGA’s. Studio will represent the entity behind a film that collectively bargains with the craft unions.
4. See generally WEXMAN, supra note 1; CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS,
HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 4 (2016).
5. Interview with anonymous entertainment lawyer (Oct. 24, 2021) [hereinafter Oct. 24 Interview].
6. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 14.
7. Id.
8. Catherine L. Fisk, The Writer’s Share, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 621, 621-22 (2017).
9. WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., IV. END OF PRODUCTION, E. How to initiate an arbitration,
CREDITS SURVIVAL GUIDE, https://www.wga.org/contracts/credits/manuals/survival-guide.
10. Id.
11. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
12. Id.
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DGA.13 In light of the above circumstances, this paper will seek to answer
these questions: (1) whether the DGA should adopt a more formalized
system of disputing credit from the studio, (2) whether that formalized
system should mimic the WGA arbitration process, and (3) if not a mimicry,
whether there is a better formal alternate dispute resolution process that the
DGA should strive for and how it should look. The focus will be on the film
(or theatrical) industry.14

II. CREDIT ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL
In Hollywood, “credit” is what gets your name on the big screen. The
phrases “Written By,” “Story By,” and “Directed By” are all forms of credits
that demonstrate a person’s contribution to a film. The opening and ending
credits are integral to a movie’s organization, and it would be strange to live
in a cinematic world without them. What’s less known to the public is how
these credits come to exist. These credits are crucial for members of craft
unions because when a writer or director receives a credit, they also receive
residuals on the film.15 Residuals are compensation for the “reuse of
copyrighted materials.”16 The credit process begins with the studio that hired
union members—for movies, this is generally a studio like Paramount
Pictures and Warner Bros.17 At the end of the principal production of a film,
the studio curates a list of workers that contributed to the film; for the WGA,
this list is called the Notice of Tentative Writing Credits (“NTWC”).18 The
NTWC triggers “complex credit rules,” and these codified rules for WGA
members are “the most detailed statement in American law of the meaning
of authorship.”19 Upon seeing the NTWC for a given film, a writer who is
not included on the list but believes they should receive attribution has the
option to initiate a credit arbitration.20 In some cases, credit arbitration is
automatically triggered when a production executive is proposed for writing
credit and there are non-production executive participating writers on the
project.21

13. Mark Harrison, Whose Film is It Anyway? Unpicking Movies with Multiple Directors, DEN OF
GEEK (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.denofgeek.com/movies/whose-film-is-it-anyway-unpicking-movieswith-multiple-directors/.
14. In television, directors frequently switch episode to episode, and the main creative vision comes
from the “showrunner,” who is essentially an executive producer. See generally MasterClass staff, What
Is a Showrunner: Shonda Rhimes’s Advice for Showrunners, MASTERCLASS (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.masterclass.com/articles/what-is-a-showrunner-shonda-rhimess-advice-for-showrunners.
15. Fisk, supra note 8, at 622.
16. Id.
17. Interview with Lesley Mackey, Senior Director of Credits of the WGA (Nov. 3, 2021)
[hereinafter Mackey Interview].
18. Id.
19. FISK, supra note 4.
20. WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., supra note 9.
21. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.

Spring 2022

CUT! . . . OUT OF CREDIT ARBITRATION

225

A credit arbitration is an alternate dispute resolution mechanism by
which a Hollywood guild member, typically a writer, protests the studio’s
decision to not credit the writer in the film and makes their case before a
panel of arbiters.22 These rules are detailed in the WGA’s collective
bargaining agreement (the Minimum Basic Agreement or “MBA”), which
are renegotiated every three years by the WGA and the Alliance of Motion
Picture and Television Producers (“AMPTP”), and in related promulgated
documents.23
A. THE STEPS TO WGA CREDIT ARBITRATION
Upon the release of the studio’s NTWC, the WGA Credits Department
reviews the notice to make sure that the credits have been attributed properly
(checking for incorrect spellings, improper crediting, incorrect form(s) of
credits proposed, incorrect ordering of credits, etc.).24 From there, the WGA
sends the notice to its members. If a member wants to protest the tentative
credits, they “must send a written protest to the Guild and to the [studio].”25
The WGA then asks the studio to send all its materials it has with respect to
the film’s script; when the studio forwards these materials to the WGA, the
clock starts to make a final determination of credits, and the WGA gets a
total of 21 days to do so.26
After any critical WGA investigations and pre-arbitration hearings, the
writer must anonymize their materials to submit to the arbitrators and
confirm their eligibility for the credit based on the percentage of the work
the writer contributed to the film.27 The writers then review a list of potential
arbitrators and may strike names from the list to guarantee those arbiters will
not oversee their case.28 This ensures the writers will not be judged by
someone they believe is already familiar with their writing style,
consequently rendering the writer’s anonymity moot.
The arbitrators themselves are what make this credit arbitration so
unique. The WGA membership makes the rules for determining writing
credit, including the process and the contributions required to receive credit,
and they have decided that the question of who should receive credit should
22. See generally WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., supra note 9.
23. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5; ALLIANCE OF MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION PRODUCERS,
https://www.amptp.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2021); see, e.g., WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., WRITERS
GUILD OF AM. 2017 THEATRICAL & TEL. BASIC AGREEMENT (2017).
24. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.
25. WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., supra note 9.
26. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.
27. See WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., APPENDIX A: CREDIT RULES FOR ORIGINAL SCREENPLAYS 1,
https://www.wga.org/uploadedfiles/credits/Appendix_A.pdf (e.g., for a “sole screenplay credit, [Writer
A must] have contributed more than 33% to any or all of the four screenplay elements and no other writer
has contributed 50% . . . to any of the four screenplay elements”).
28. WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., VII. PREPARING FOR ARBITRATION, F. Deletions from the
Arbiters List, CREDITS SURVIVAL GUIDE, https://www.wga.org/contracts/credits/manuals/survival-guide.
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be decided by a writer.29 In other words, unlike other arbitrations, credit
arbiters are not lawyers, but screenwriters, as screenwriters can better
understand and make judgments on another’s contribution to plot, characters,
setting, etc., of a film.30
The WGA selects three arbiters to participate in the arbitration and
sends those arbiters the anonymized packets of material (including scripts)
to review.31 The arbiters must base their decision on the rules set forth in the
Screen Credits Manual.32 Once the arbiters decide, they each call and send a
written decision notice to the WGA.33 The WGA notifies the writer of the
decision.34
If the writer is unsatisfied with the result, they may appeal within 24
hours of receiving notice of the decision.35 The appellate panel for the WGA
is the Policy Review Board (“PRB”), which is a committee made up of three
members of the Guild, who serve on the Screen Credits Committee, which
is a standing committee whose members determine issues prior to
arbitration.36 All the PRB may provide is a procedural review; the PRB
cannot read the writers’ material.37 When the PRB makes its decision, one of
the following may happen: if there is no valid ground for appeal, the decision
of the Arbitration Committee is upheld (and notice is given to the studio); if
there is a ground, the PRB can either order the arbitration sent back to the
original Arbitration Committee with instructions or direct staff to empanel a
new Arbitration Committee.38
Of the two to three hundred NTWCs the WGA has received from
studios for film credits this year, about 60 arbitrations have resulted (not
including cases currently pending).39 On a few occasions, writers have sued
the WGA and the studio for the rights to a credit in court after a failed
arbitration, but the writer never wins.40 Courts generally do not want to
intervene in creative decisions, and they usually determine that the WGA
rationally decided the matter so they do not need to undo what the WGA has
already done.41

29. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., supra note 9.
36. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5; see, e.g., Ferguson v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 226 Cal. App.
3d 1382 (1991); Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., 992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).
41. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
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B. THE PRODUCERS GUILD (“PGA”) AND ITS APPROACH TO CREDIT
The PGA, while not a union and without a collectively bargained
agreement like the WGA, follows certain credit rules that its members must
follow if they wish to receive the “p.g.a.” mark and consequently be eligible
to share in a Best Picture Oscar (as the Motion Picture Academy keys off of
the p.g.a. mark).42 “[The p.g.a. mark] identifies those producers determined
by the PGA to have performed a major portion of the producing work in a
decision-making capacity on a particular motion picture.”43 After a film’s
production, the studio sends to the PGA a list of names of producers credited
to the film, and the PGA will contact those members to ask if they want to
apply for the p.g.a. credit.44 Interested producers submit an eligibility form,
and the PGA conducts interviews with other talent on the project, like the
director and writers, to ascertain the producers’ contribution to the film. 45
Where a review of materials is required before deciding which producers get
the p.g.a. credit (which isn’t always), the PGA assembles a panel of arbiters
called the Producers Mark Determination Panel.46 Like WGA credit
arbitration, these arbiters are also producers.47 The eligible producers’
materials do not contain the producers’ names, but when an arbiter can
deduce the identity of a given producer the arbiter can either “proceed
without bias or recuse her/himself from the Panel.”48 The PGA recommends
the panel give a percentage of weight to different stages of production,49 but
otherwise the panel is free to consider various aspects in coming to a
decision, such as the producer’s contribution to diversity, equity and
inclusion, the producer’s level of responsibility, feedback from interviewees
who worked on the film with the producer, what work the producer
contributed if the film was a sequel, whether they worked on a producing
team, etc.50 The panel then renders a decision that a producer may appeal;
interestingly, the appellate arbiters are producers who can review all the
evidence in full again, unlike the WGA’s PRB. 51

III. THE DIRECTORS GUILD: THE INFORMAL ATTRIBUTION

42. Id.
43. PRODUCERS GUILD OF AM., RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCERS MARK ELIGIBILITY –
MOTION PICTURES 3 (2021).
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 8-9.
51. Id. at 10-11.
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PROCESS
A. THE ROLE OF DIRECTORS IN HOLLYWOOD
Film directors fit a unique niche in cinema. Unlike both writers and
producers in their respective guilds, directors very rarely compete for credit
among other directors. This is mostly due to the director’s role as the glue
that holds the entire film together through singular decision-making.52 The
director is meant to be the everyman with a creative vision. They
communicate to every department on set, like a conductor unifying the
percussion, string, and wind sections of an orchestra.
While the public tends to view the director as a role for just one person,
that wasn’t always the case in Hollywood. In the early twentieth century,
studios began splitting off director’s duties, assigning a movie’s scenes to
different directors.53 Directors despised this practice because it made movies
unpleasantly disjointed in theme and style.54 The DGA grew adamant that
the only way to support the creative vision of a director was to make sure no
multiple directors were assigned to a project.55
In the mid-twentieth century, a group of French critics began a
movement that put the director at the forefront of film.56 Dubbed auteurism,
this movement “championed directors, [giving] significant boost to the
DGA’s efforts to cast its members as creators in the high art tradition.”57 The
director was portrayed as the major creative force of a motion picture. 58
While the WGA had to fight to get the proper names credited to a film in the
first place, the DGA had no issue splashing its members’ names prominently
on posters for the world to see.59
That’s not the end of the story, however. In the age of directing teams
like the Coen brothers, the fear of directors losing their creative authority to
studios if they add a second name to the directing credit has become a less
terrifying prospect since its heyday pre-World War II.60 Auteur theory also
ignores all the collaboration and labor that contribute to modern
filmmaking.61 In fact, the empowerment of writers through the WGA’s
52. VOICES OF LABOR: CREATIVITY, CRAFT, AND CONFLICT IN GLOBAL HOLLYWOOD 45-46
(Michael Curtin & Kevin Sanson eds., 2017) [hereinafter VOICES OF LABOR].
53. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 15.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 35.
60. Id. at 15.
61. See generally Harrison, supra note 13; Luke Winkie, Everything We Know (and Don’t) About
the Averted IATSE Strike, VULTURE (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.vulture.com/article/iatse-strikeexplained.html; see, e.g., Stephanie Zacharek, We Can’t Talk About Bohemian Rhapsody Without Talking
About Bryan Singer, TIME (Jan. 7, 2019, 3:39 PM), https://time.com/5495937/bohemian-rhapsodybryan-singer-controversy/ (the critic’s commentary on filmmaking: “I see a creation that works because
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collective bargaining has changed the entertainment industry to be more
writer-centric, if anything.62 Meanwhile, directors’ attitudes towards the
creative process have also shifted, clashing with the DGA’s archaic auteur
theoretical shield.63 Directors recognize that they are not the ultimate
authority in every component that goes into making a film; there are too
many areas of expertise that one creative director could not possibly know
everything about.64 Directors will make decisions within these areas like
supervisors, but the heads of each department are the ones that “realize those
choices.”65 Directors themselves also have their own managerial team: this
team usually consists of a unit production manager, first assistant director,
second assistant director, and associate director, who all have administrative
rather than creative duties.66
Given this evolving view of directors and their role in cinema, there
have been increasing instances where, like the other talent guilds, the
directors face credit disputes. The changed status of the director and the
subsequent doubts about credit merit a discussion about what directors and
the DGA do when they dispute a credit from the studios, and whether the
procedure in place should continue resolving those disputes.
B. THE DGA’S CURRENT CREDIT DISPUTE PROCEDURE
There are a few basic rules for directors as to how they are assigned to
movies and what kind of credit they can receive. Strikingly, the DGA
requires that only one director ever be assigned to a film, with the exception
of directing teams and situations where having only one director would
conflict with “foreign laws, regulations or subsidies;” a project requires a
specialty director; or two directors apply for the same project “based on

a bunch of musicians and choreographers, of lighting technicians and camerapeople, of people working
above and below the line—including, of course, actors—knew what they were doing and believed in it.
You don’t have to like the picture to accept that, like all big-budget movies, it bears the fingerprints of
many hands, including that of its director. Film is alchemy. There’s so much that can go wrong, and also
a million and one nearly imperceptible elements that have to somehow go right.”).
62. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
63. See, e.g., Paul Brownfield, Thomas Kail’s High-Wire Act, DGA QUARTERLY (Summer 2019),
https://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-Articles/1903-Summer-2019/Breakthrough-Thomas-Kail.aspx
(“‘The thing that’s so fun about film and television is, you get to produce and support other directors. . . .
That just doesn’t happen in theater. There’s one director.’”); see also WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 84
(commenting on the insistence of the DGA to give directors the “film by” credit, “[d]espite the DGA’s
aggressive stance on the issue of possessory credits, however, not all directors are convinced of its value.
Steven Soderbergh has consistently refused it, as has Woody Allen, who called it ‘pretentious and
unnecessary.’); see generally Who is a “Film by?” The Writers Guild vs The Directors Guild, THE BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2019/01/who-is-a-film-by-the-writers-guild-vs-thedirectors-guild/.
64. VOICES OF LABOR, supra note 52, at 45.
65. Id. at 46.
66. DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., INC. BASIC AGREEMENT OF 2017 14-20
(2017); DGA TRAINING PROGRAM, https://www.dgatrainingprogram.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
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professional necessity.”67 The default credit for the director per the DGA is
“Directed by,” with specific designations on its positioning in the movie, on
posters, and in advertisements.68 Another credit is the possessive credit—the
coveted “Film by” credit—which is permitted for a director if the film is not
their first.69 While a single director receives full residuals for the film, a
directing team (like the Wachowskis) must share the residuals.70
When more than one director works on a project without being part of
an authorized directorial team, the studio notifies the DGA and those
directors of the studio’s choice for the official directing credit. 71 A
dissatisfied director must “immediately appeal directly to the [DGA] and
likewise notify the [studio] in writing that he or she is so doing.”72 The DGA
by itself reaches a decision that is final; the studio only decides the credit if
the DGA does not notify the studio of its decision within fourteen days.73
The basic agreement does not go into detail about how the DGA
determines credit.74 In practice, the DGA negotiates informally with the
directors and their representatives.75 This sharply contrasts the lawyer-less
credit dispute resolution within the WGA. When a director is replaced during
production, and the studio decides that the second director should receive the
credit, the first director with their attorney may argue to the DGA that the
first director should receive sole credit for the film.76 This negotiation
typically happens only over phone call or email.77 In these instances, for the
first director to hire an attorney is especially helpful, if anything to assist in
the negotiation process with the DGA.78 With respect to animated films, the
DGA is more flexible on the number of directors attributed to the film
because of the “extra work entailed, [and] the larger timescale on which
animation is produced allows for cleaner changes of director.”79
There have been a couple occasions where credit determinations were
considered through a likely informal arbitration, but very little is written
about it.80 No descriptions of the manner or procedure of the arbitration have

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., supra note 66, at 62.
Id. at 98, 100-06.
Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
Id.
DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., supra note 66, at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
See generally CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 107 (3d ed. 2019).
79. Harrison, supra note 13.
80. See, e.g., id. (“[Arbitration]’s happened on a couple of Pixar films, including Ratatouille and The
Good Dinosaur”); see also WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 76-77 (“When [Death of a Gunfighter’s] original
director, Robert Totten, was fired after clashing with star Richard Widmark, Don Siegel was brought in
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been documented for easy public access. These arbitrations likely occurred
in absolute worst-case scenarios, and since a director credit dispute usually
consists only of two to three contenders for the credit, it is improbable that
the DGA in those instances precisely replicated the WGA’s arbitration
process.
C. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DIRECTOR CREDIT DISPUTES
A director’s contribution to a film is not as tangible as that of a writer.81
A director’s job on a film is to realize their “vision” of a film, which is
challenging to quantify.82 Should a credit dispute arise among directors,
resolving it would inevitably be complicated: which vision of two competing
directors dominated a film? Can two directors share that vision? Does the
studio agree with that vision? Does the director dispute the vision forced
upon them by the studio? If a director receives credit, presumably it is their
vision on display on the big screen. The following will discuss conflicts that
have arisen with respect to vision and credit in the last few decades.
1. The D-team: who gets dual directing credit?
While the DGA dictates there be only one director attributed to a film,
there is an exception for bona fide directing teams.83 To qualify as a directing
team, a pair of directors must obtain a “specific waiver” from the DGA to
codirect, as codified in the 1978 DGA Basic Agreement.84 This kind of team
is defined by the Western Directors Council “as teams who ‘learned how to
direct together, by actually doing, and have therefore demonstrated that they
perform the director’s duties as if they were actually one director.’”85 The
team must demonstrate a “history of cooperative activity.” 86 Further,
codirectors that “split up their duties rather than work[] in tandem” won’t
receive the DGA’s blessing as a directing team.87 Some examples of teams
that successfully waived the one-director requirement are the Coen Brothers
and the Wachowski sisters88; notably, these directing team examples are
pairs of siblings, which speaks to the likelihood that the “learned to direct
together” requirement was satisfied for both. A non-sibling team example is
to finish the picture. Siegel, however, did not want to sign the film and appealed to DGA arbitration. The
final credit on Death of a Gunfighter thus reads “‘Directed by Allen Smithee.’”).
81. VOICES OF LABOR, supra note 52, at 45.
82. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
83. DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., supra note 66, at 62.
84. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 74.
85. Dave McNary, DGA Accused of Bias Against Female Directing Teams by ‘Crazy Ex-Girlfriend’
Director, VARIETY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/crazy-ex-girlfriend-director-dga1202987025/ (quoting Ted Elrick, Singularity of Vision, DGA QUARTERLY (May 2004),
https://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-Articles/0405-May-2004/Singularity-of-Vision.aspx).
86. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 76.
87. Id.
88. Harrison, supra note 13.
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Phil Lord and Chris Miller, who met and started working together when they
both attended Dartmouth College.89
The above directing teams had to overcome a significant hurdle to be
credited together. There are plenty of requests to the DGA from directors to
waive the one-director policy, with minimal success.90 One example of a
team that failed to sway the DGA is Robert Rodriguez and Frank Miller [a
comic book writer who wrote the source material of the movie “Sin City”
which he “co-directed” with Rodriguez], and “guest director” Quentin
Tarantino.91
Another time the DGA rejected a pair as an official directing team was
in the case of Audrey Wauchope and Rachel Specter for the TV show “Crazy
Ex-Girlfriend.”92 While the DGA had permitted Lasse Hallstrom and Joe
Johnston to share the credit for The Nutcracker and the Four Realms when
the directors had staggered their work on the film, the DGA rejected
Wauchope and Specter’s waiver of the one-director-to-feature rule later that
same year.93 The two directors accused the DGA of sexism in making this
decision, since the reason Wauchope and Specter did not have a sufficient
history of a collaborative filmmaking was because they took time away from
the industry to have children.94
The DGA has faced more requests for waivers in recent years,95 and
with its strict guidelines in place the DGA may need to consider creating a
more flexible standard to adjust to modern-day nuances and equity in
filmmaking.
2. A disturbance in the force: Lucasfilm’s struggles with the DGA
George Lucas, creator of Star Wars, sparked trouble with the DGA
when he refused to follow its order to change the location of the director
credit for the movie Empire Strikes Back.96 This disagreement was
emblematic of the DGA’s position that the director, as the author of a film,
should have their name displayed at the beginning rather than the end of the
movie.97
89. Phil
Lord
and
Chris
Miller,
Producers,
SONY
PICTURES
ANIMATION,
https://www.sonypicturesanimation.com/our-team/filmmakers/phil-lord-and-chris-miller (last visited
Nov. 15, 2021).
90. Ted
Elrick,
Singularity
of
Vision,
DGA
QUARTERLY
(May
2004),
https://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-Articles/0405-May-2004/Singularity-of-Vision.aspx.
91. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 75 (citing Daniel Engber, Why Not Quit the Directors Guild?, SLATE
(Apr. 8, 2005), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/04/why-not-quit-the-directors-guild.html).
92. Dave McNary, DGA Accused of Bias Against Female Directing Teams by ‘Crazy Ex-Girlfriend’
Director, VARIETY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/crazy-ex-girlfriend-director-dga1202987025/.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 76 (citing Elrick, supra note 90).
96. Id. at 72.
97. Id.
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Another interesting issue that arose from a Star Wars movie was the
replacement of directors Phil Lord and Chris Miller by Ron Howard in the
making of Solo: A Star Wars Story.98 Mid-production, Lucasfilm president
Kathleen Kennedy determined (allegedly) that Phil Lord and Chris Miller
did not share the creative vision of Lucasfilm.99 Kennedy managed to remove
the duo before a DGA deadline, and Lord and Miller accepted executive
producer credits.100 Fascinatingly, Lucasfilm found a loophole to prevent the
full creative rights going to the director, presumably on the basis of creative
differences—a circumstance that the DGA supposedly rejects in its mission
to liberate the director from the clutches of a major studio.
3. In #Me2-D: removing problematic directors
In the era of the #MeToo movement, powerful players in Hollywood
have been exposed as harassers who take advantage of their authoritative
positions to prey on others. A prime example is producer Harvey Weinstein,
whose reign of terror opened the dialogue about harassment on social media.
Many creative talents in Hollywood (directors, producers, and writers) have
faced accusations, leading studios to cut ties and terminate all future projects
with the accused talent, and the talent to resign from their respective
guilds.101
Hollywood directors are not immune to this publicity. Among the
laborers that work on a film, directors are some of the most influential on set
and unfortunately, some use this angle for ill will. The DGA and studios have
had to deal with the consequences of public outcry against a director
condemned for sexual misconduct. This can lead (or should lead) to a
changed credit when the director is exposed in the middle of filmmaking and
has satisfied the minimum requirements for earning credit per the DGA basic
agreement.
Where this potential change could manifest is in a situation like the one
Bryan Singer faced in late 2017. A director most known for Usual Suspects
and X-Men, Bryan Singer was criticized for alleged past sexual misconduct

98. Han Solo: The DGA Rule That Explains Lord and Miller’s Mid-Production Firing, SCREEN
RANT (July 29, 2017), https://screenrant.com/han-solo-lord-miller-firing-dga-rule/2/.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Ricardo Lopez, Warner Bros. Cuts Final Ties with Brett Ratner, Won’t Renew $450Million Co-Financing Deal, VARIETY (Apr. 11, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/brett-ratnerwarners-cofinancing-deal-ends-1202750809/; Gregg Kilday, Harvey Weinstein Resigns from Producers
Guild of America, Is Now Banned for Life, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/harvey-weinstein-resigns-producers-guildamerica-1050625/; Phil McCausland, Filmmaker Morgan Spurlock admits to history of sexual
misconduct, NBC NEWS (Dec.
13,
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexualmisconduct/filmmaker-morgan-spurlock-admits-history-sexual-misconduct-n829581; Neil Vigdor,
Woody Allen and Amazon Settle Breach of Contract Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/09/arts/woody-allen-amazon-lawsuit.html.
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(including an alleged rape of a minor) and flakiness on set during production
of Bohemian Rhapsody.102 20th Century Fox, the studio behind Bohemian
Rhapsody, fired Singer and replaced him with director Dexter Fletcher who
wrapped the movie.103 The film won a couple Oscars, but those who were
involved in Bohemian Rhapsody’s production never discussed the fact that
Bryan Singer was attributed directing credit per the DGA’s rules; that is, he
claimed all the credit in spite of his poor behavior on set, his track record for
sexual misconduct, and the additional director hired to clean up the mess
he’d left behind.104 The studio rightly responded to a director with bad press
acting out on the job by firing him, but had no choice but to abide by the
DGA’s absolutist rules that provide no flexibility on a case-to-case basis.
However, in the wake of this scandal, another movie Singer was directing
was put on hold and ultimately never made.105

IV. CREATING A FORMAL ATTRIBUTION PROCESS FOR THE DGA
The DGA’s informal negotiation procedure starkly contrasts the
formalized credit arbitration used by the WGA and to a certain degree that
of the PGA. This makes some sense, since the guilds view credit differently;
the DGA pursues the ideal of the sole director, but the WGA wants credit
attributed to writers no matter the number. Importantly, modern-day
directors do not universally ascribe to the auteur theory, and many find their
pleas to the DGA to be free of the restrictions of this cinematic philosophy
rejected. Paradoxically, the DGA’s mission to keep creative choices out of
the hands of the studios to rest solely with one director’s artistic vision
clashes with its own members’ modern opinions on directing credits, which
has fueled conflict among the individuals the DGA was intended to
support.106
Since the role of the director has evolved, and credit disputes up to this
time have been decided based on rules that take up a mere paragraph in the
DGA’s basic agreement,107 perhaps the time has come to rethink how the
DGA resolves credit disputes. Can informal negotiation practice be changed
to better accommodate present-day reality? In the past few decades,
prominent credit issues that have arisen within the DGA concern (1)
unrecognized directing teams and (2) public backlash of hiring and keeping
“cancelled” directors. These problems present a nuance that throws the
102. Zacharek, supra note 61.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
106. See, e.g., Dave McNary, DGA Accused of Bias Against Female Directing Teams by ‘Crazy ExGirlfriend’ Director, VARIETY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/crazy-ex-girlfrienddirector-dga-1202987025/.
107. DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., INC. BASIC AGREEMENT OF 2017 98, https://www.dga.org//media/E912CA508ACF4446BA1C0DEB1B49ED89.pdf.
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standard “directors v. studios” dispute eschew in granting credits. Given that
the WGA, a union like the DGA, already has arbitrations in place, the
possibility of adopting the same system for the DGA should first be
considered.
A. PURE MIMICRY OF THE WGA CREDIT ARBITRATION PROCESS
Copying the WGA’s credit arbitration would be the most convenient
solution if only to not reinvent something special for directors. The WGA
has undergone arbitrations for nearly a century with few changes.108
Furthermore, a distinct advantage of WGA-style credit arbitration for the
DGA is equity. The DGA historically has faced issues with accepting diverse
members.109 Entertainment industry aside, anonymity is an effective way to
prevent an evaluator’s bias when they judge material.110 The WGA
anonymizes the writers that go through arbitration for film credit. 111 With
this in mind, the DGA could promote lesser-known directors through credit
arbitrations. During informal negotiations, the disputing directors are known
to all parties, and bias and greed may cloud the results of these negotiations.
There are unfortunately some problems with completely mimicking the
WGA manner of arbitration for directors. First, there is room for
improvement in the WGA arbitration process. For one, the selection of
arbiters is not ideal. The WGA does not pay arbiters to review scripts of
disputing writers.112 WGA employees must call up arbiters, who are WGA
members eligible to be on, and have been added to, the arbiters’ lists, and
ask them to review scripts; often the WGA must depend on “repeat players”
– arbiters who regularly volunteer to receive and review scripts.113 While
there have been debates in the WGA about paying arbiters, such a policy is
not in place at this time.114 Understandably, the DGA may resist a system in
which they must beg other directors (acting as arbiters) to review a disputing
director’s content without pay. Sadly, there is also no equivalent of a final
shooting script in the director’s realm, so the materials that an arbiter for
directors would review, and the cost of assembling them, is less certain:
would the arbiters watch footage of the movie? Read scene directions?
Transcripts of meetings with actors?
Second, the WGA’s credit arbitration takes many steps, and with its
harsh deadlines, WGA employees must work quickly and effectively. As a
108. FISK, supra note 4, at 64-65.
109. EITHNE QUINN, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: RACE AND LABOR IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS HOLLYWOOD
29 (2020).
110. BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC
SCIENCE, AND LAW 254 (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016).
111. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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result, writers feel supported by the reliability of the WGA’s credit
arbitration process and take advantage of it when they are dissatisfied with
the studio’s attribution. 115 The DGA, on the other hand, would likely not
want to establish this system because directors may similarly take advantage
of the system when they can. The DGA likely assumes that through informal
negotiation, there is no due process issues that the WGA credit arbitration
faces as a binding dispute resolution. Moreover, the DGA might see an
installation of credit arbitration as potentially opening the flood gates to
insignificant and perhaps petty disputes that do not currently go to
negotiation.
The WGA formed a system that functioned best for the needs of its
members, but that is no guarantee that the same system would mold well to
director disputes. That is not to say, however, that a lesson cannot be learned
here from the WGA’s well-established alternate dispute resolution system.
What the WGA accomplished, and the DGA has yet to execute, is a system
in which the debate around credit received the attention of a neutral-third
party. The WGA instituted a strong safeguard for writers when it created a
process that was confidential, anonymous, bereft of financial gains to any
party, and settled at the say-so of knowledgeable neutrals. This system
ensured that credit was given to those who substantively deserved it.
B. FASHIONING A UNIQUE CREDIT DISPUTE PROCESS
1. Unrecognized directors’ teams
The long road to equality among directors that have endured prejudice
in Hollywood, like women and POC film directors, has made some progress
in recent years.116 The DGA started as a difficult union to enter in the midtwentieth century due to its admission that relied on paternity (i.e., if an
applicant to the DGA’s father had also been a director, the DGA favored that
applicant), college education, etc., which caused a “near-total freeze-out” of
minority directors.117 This inequality has been particularly evident in debates
over what defines a “directing team.”118 These debates have arisen more
frequently since the turn of the century, and the years following have shown
that several directors will voluntarily sign on to projects with other
directors.119 Whatever the reason may be, a lot of directors want co115. Id.
116. See generally EITHNE QUINN, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: RACE AND LABOR IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS
HOLLYWOOD (2020); Zimmer, supra note 2, at 229.
117. EITHNE QUINN, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: RACE AND LABOR IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS HOLLYWOOD
98-99 (2020).
118. Dave McNary, DGA Accused of Bias Against Female Directing Teams by ‘Crazy Ex-Girlfriend’
Director, VARIETY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/crazy-ex-girlfriend-director-dga1202987025/.
119. Ted
Elrick,
Singularity
of
Vision,
DGA
QUARTERLY
(May
2004),
https://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-Articles/0405-May-2004/Singularity-of-Vision.aspx (“There has
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authorship, in defiance of auteur theory, but quite often do not have the
blessing of the DGA to make that a reality. As previously discussed, in
determining whether a directing team is bona fide, the DGA looks to the two
directors’ long-standing history of cooperation in filmmaking. Because of
societal obstacles for directors that do not fit squarely into the cis-straightwhite-male paradigm, arguing their case before the DGA can prove to be an
insurmountable task.120 When the DGA scrutinizes directing teams under
these restrictive standards, a director that worked alongside another director
will unjustly go without credit.
One solution would be for the DGA, directors, and studios to
renegotiate the meaning of the term “bona fide directing team.” The stringent
yet subjective requirement of a long history of cooperation between the
directors under the current definition leaves out many co-directors that
would otherwise qualify because of their singular vision.121 If the DGA were
to modify its criteria for directing teams so that they recognize the barriers
many artists face because of their gender, race, sexuality, etc., the DGA will
do good on its word to better represent diversity in their membership and at
the movies.122 Some ways to approach this is by having the criteria (1) place
less emphasis on the two directors having been educated together, (2) reduce
the number of occasions of cooperation required to be considered a team,
and (3) consider the similarities between each director’s style and how the
styles complement each other to form one unique style.
Additionally, studios likely have few qualms about the number of
directors attributed to a film; in fact, it was the ease with which they hired
multiple directors at a time that so scandalized industry directors in the early
twentieth century.123 The one-director rule was meant to prevent the studios
from doing this, so if directors decide themselves to have more than one
director, the studios are unlikely to protest.
Another solution, perhaps in concert with the first, is to establish an
alternate dispute resolution process that allows a third-party neutral to
oversee the merits of the case for the waiver of the DGA’s one-director rule.
One possibility would be to have an arbitration process similar to that of the
PGA for producers that want to receive the “p.g.a.” mark. Parallel to the
producers’ submission of an eligibility form, directors already submit

been a substantial increase in co-directing waiver requests to the WDC. There were 15 requests (10
granted) between 1979 and 1989; 19 requests (11 granted) from 1990 to 1999. However in the 39-month
period since the new millennium there have been 22 requests for co-directing waivers of which 12 waivers
were granted”).
120. McNary, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. Zimmer, supra note 2, at 229; Farewell Letter from President Thomas Schlamme, DGA GUILD
NEWS, https://www.dga.org/News/Guild-News/2021/September2021/Schlamme_Farewell_Letter.aspx
(last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
123. WEXMAN, supra note 1.
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requests to the DGA to waive the one-director rule.124 Importantly, the
PGA’s system has a provision that allows for the PGA to come to a decision
on its own, without the need for producer arbiters to convene to review
materials.125 Where directing teams are concerned, pairs of directors may
initiate a PGA-style proceeding by simply requesting the DGA waiver for
their given reasons. Under the PGA system, if those reasons fall under the
criteria for a directing team (whether those criteria are the same or more
accommodating after a renegotiation), the DGA could have the option not to
convene a panel of arbiters to review the materials and instead come to a
decision on its own. This way, the directing team credit dispute process
would avoid the WGA’s challenges of having to constantly call and ask
writers to volunteer their time to be arbiters. If the DGA automatically agrees
with the directing team, no official arbitration would be necessary, which
saves time.
Unfortunately, the above is already more or less what practically
happens in the DGA when qualifying directing teams.126 To ensure a fair
procedure, the directors should have an option to request an arbitration if
they are unsatisfied with the DGA’s response. If the DGA openly admits that
it is uncertain whether the directing team meets the criteria, it should then be
obligated to convene a panel of three arbiters. Like in the PGA, these
panelists should be directors who can review the directing team’s materials
to determine whether the qualifications have been met. Ideally, the directing
team should have the chance to strike names from a list of potential arbiters.
With respect to the “materials” submitted by a director to the DGA,
producers share the same intangibility in their work product as directors.
Unlike writers, whose work can be read, producers and directors are
employed mostly as decision-makers, and much of their contribution to a
film, and the reason they deserve the “p.g.a.” or “Directed by” credit, is their
investment in helping the production run smoothly and seamlessly.127 The
more fluid PGA standards that ask arbiters to observe a producer’s time
working on a film, their general message, their interactions with staff, etc.,
lend themselves better to a guideline for a directing team’s waiver
determination. The arbiters can review interviews from other staffers on the
set who witnessed the team working together, documents detailing the
various decisions of the team to demonstrate the unique vision they shared,
etc. The arbiters may also be looking for some mitigating factors such as
124. Elrick, supra note 119.
125. PRODUCERS GUILD OF AM., RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCERS MARK ELIGIBILITY –
MOTION
PICTURES
7
(2021),
https://www.producersguildawards.com/Content/documents/PM_Master_Rules_Documentary_Motion_
Pictures.pdf.
126. McNary, supra note 121; Elrick, supra note 124.
127. See generally PRODUCERS GUILD OF AM., supra note 125; see also VOICES OF LABOR, supra
note 52, at 45-46.
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social obstacles that prevented the team from satisfying a specific criterion
for directing teams. From the materials, the arbiters may assess whether there
was any undue influence of one director over another, in which case the
arbiters will likely find that the directors did not act as a cohesive pair.
Directors that are aware of this problematic image and find it misleading to
the arbiters may choose to include explanations for the choices made to
demonstrate that they were in fact decided in tandem. So long as the arbiters
are knowledgeable of the craft, they should be able to evaluate the veracity
of the documents before them.
Like striking the names of arbiters off a list, the anonymity of the
petitioning writers and producers to arbitration is another aspect of credit
arbitration that makes the process fairer to the parties. The arbiters decide
blindly, and when they cannot, they must promise to remain unbiased or
recuse themselves.128 The director arbiters should review the materials under
the same rules. As it is always best for writers to decide whether credit should
be given to a writer,129 so too should a director decide whether a team of
directors properly worked as a team to get dual directing credit.
Once the director arbitration panel decides, the directors may accept the
result or request an appeal as is possible in both the WGA and the PGA. Like
with the PGA, the directors should be able to have their appellate panel be
other directors that review the materials a second time.
The exasperation that proposed directing teams currently feel when the
DGA dismisses their desire to be a credited team can be resolved by having
other, neutral eyes weigh in. Additionally, by maintaining a set of criteria
but having anonymous directors apply facts to those criteria on a case-bycase basis for the benefit of other directors will still protect the DGA
members from the risk of studios overstuffing the director’s chair.130
2. The “cancelled” director
Whatever one’s opinion on “cancel culture” may be, the fact remains
that it exists and it’s not going away any time soon, due in large part to the
messages of recent movements like Black Lives Matter and #MeToo. The
definition of “canceling” divides Americans, as some folks define it as
holding public figures accountable for their actions, and others as unjust
punishment and censorship.131 How large corporations respond to public
backlash is critical: does a company make an empty statement about equality

128. PRODUCERS GUILD OF AM., supra note 127 at 8.
129. Mackey Interview, supra note 17.
130. WEXMAN, supra note 1.
131. See Americans and ‘Cancel Culture’: Where Some See Calls for Accountability, Others See
Censorship,
Punishment,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(May
19,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/05/19/americans-and-cancel-culture-where-some-see-callsfor-accountability-others-see-censorship-punishment/.
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and diversity, or does it change its operations to its potential economic
detriment for the sake of equality and diversity?132
The entertainment industry must now contend with a reality in which
any decision made within its previously impervious walls is open to public
comment and criticism.133 Major film studios like Warner Bros. and
Paramount Pictures rely on box office sales to make a profit; if people refuse
to see movies because they disagree with a director assigned to the picture,
the studio will lose money at the box office, notwithstanding COVID-19.
The act of “cancelling” in these instances can spell financial trouble for
studios. At odds with this economic motivation to remove bad eggs from
cinema is the guilds’ take on accountability for misconduct in the industry;
that is, the guilds have different approaches to how to treat an accused
individual.134 This treatment inevitably affects whether accused individuals
receive credit.
After the havoc the Hollywood blacklist caused to writers during the
Cold War, the WGA will not revoke membership from a writer for sexual
misconduct or a criminal conviction.135 The Screen Actors Guild – American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (“SAG-AFTRA”) and the
Animation Guild meanwhile hold a proceeding in which one member can
accuse another member of misconduct, and the union will investigate and
potentially discipline, and even eject, that member.136 The DGA in turn has
been less vocal on this issue, but its leadership has recognized that it
continues to work on protecting its members from harassment.137 It is
possible that the DGA shares the WGA’s sentiment about terminating
132. See Helen Lewis, How Capitalism Drives Cancel Culture, THE ATLANTIC (July 14, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/07/cancel-culture-and-problem-wokecapitalism/614086/.
133. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
134. Jonathan Handel, #MeToo: Hollywood Guilds Grapple with How to Represent the Accuser and
the
Accused,
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER
(Feb.
15,
2018,
5:39
AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/guilds-grapple-how-represent-accuseraccused-1084439/.
135. Id.; see also GLENN FRANKEL, HIGH NOON: THE HOLLYWOOD BLACKLIST AND THE MAKING
OF AN AMERICAN CLASSIC 311 (2017) (written remarks of Michael Wilson, blacklisted Hollywood
writer, read by his widow when he was posthumously awarded an Oscar: “I trust that you younger men
and women will shelter the mavericks and dissenters in your ranks and protect their right to work . . . .
The Guild will have need of rebels and heretics if it is to survive as a union of free writers. The nation
will need of them if it is to survive as an open society”); Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5.
136. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5; Ariane Lange, “‘I’m Sorry’ Is Not Enough”: Inside The Union
Trial
Of
An
Alleged
Sexual
Harasser,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(June
6,
2018),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/arianelange/chris-savino-animation-guild-metoo-allegationsnickelodeon#:~:text=Nickelodeon%20had%20fired%20Savino%20in,the%20allegations%20to%20be%
20forgotten.
137. Oct. 24 Interview, supra note 5; DGA Procedures for Handling Sexual Harassment Complaints,
https://www.dga.org/News/Guild-News/2018/Mar2018/DGA-Procedures-for-Handling-SexualHarassment-Complaints.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2021); see also Farewell Letter from President
Thomas
Schlamme,
DGA
GUILD
NEWS,
https://www.dga.org/News/GuildNews/2021/September2021/Schlamme_Farewell_Letter.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
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membership, as the Bryan Singer scandal seems to indicate, but it is in no
way certain, given the guild’s honorable origins.138
Studios would likely be more receptive to the sway of public opinion
when deciding to keep or boot a director.139 Where this becomes a real
problem is where a director is fired, another replaces that director, and there
is a dispute about which of the two directors must get credit per the onedirector rule. The DGA explicitly grants full creative rights to the director
that has completed ninety percent of a film’s production except for instances
where the director went over budget, or the replacing director had to do more
than ten percent of directing.140 When the replacement happens midway
through production, it’s anyone’s guess who gets the directing credit. In
these circumstances, there is a mixture of interests at play, such as the needs
of (a) the studio to have a good reputation and garner public support, (b) the
director to receive just credit for a project they worked on, and (c) the public
to hold the malcontent accountable for wrongdoing. Among these interests
is the consideration of the second director that took over after the removal of
the problematic director. The newer director would presumably not take
kindly to the original director taking full credit, as the DGA would likely
propose. The studio in turn would likely side with the newer director, as the
studio hired the new director in hopes of the public not associating the film
with a “cancelled” director.
Perhaps the simplest way to organize this cluster of interests is by
dividing the conflict into a binary structure: Studio + New Director v. Old
Director + DGA. This separation operates under the following assumptions:
the studio wants the new director in place so it doesn’t receive bad publicity
and the DGA follows its strict one-director rule with its standard default that
the first director be the only director. Moreover, this restructuring of the
dispute changes the perspective of the current negotiation procedures utilized
by the DGA, as it explicitly pits the DGA against the studio. However, since
the DGA has not outright stated its opinion on how to approach membership
of “cancelled” directors and how much it would side with such a director for

138. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 11, on the DGA’s origins as likened to an artisanal guild from Middle
Ages: guilds . . . established standards that governed the activities of all members of the organization. In
America, the Jeffersonian principle of the independent citizen linked the guild ethos to democratic ideals
so that the medieval standard of mutual support was joined with a republican notion of citizenship that
carried with it associations of personal responsibility and pride. Within this framework, labor unions in
the nineteenth-century America fostered ethical standards that valued both fellowship and worker
autonomy.
139. Helen Lewis, How Capitalism Drives Cancel Culture, THE ATLANTIC (July 14, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/07/cancel-culture-and-problem-wokecapitalism/614086/, When you look at the economic incentives, almost always, the capitalist imperative
is to yield to activist pressure. Just a bit. Enough to get them off your back . . . . They want to do
something, anything, to appear as if they are taking the problem seriously—until the spotlight moves on.
140. See DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM. CREATIVE RIGHTS HANDBOOK §7-503 (2017-2020 55).

242

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

44:2

the sake of the one-director rule, there’s no guarantee that the DGA would
definitively defend the first director under these circumstances.141
Assuming the proposed dynamic best suits the overall disputes of
directors amid sexual misconduct and other cancel culture scandals, the
directors’ interests may vary in the dispute. Why does each director want
credit? One director might want credit purely for the residuals, and not as
their “signature” to a work of art.142 Perhaps one director wants the credit
because the director desires exposure to the film’s specific genre (e.g.,
science fiction), but the opposing director does not care about that exposure.
Among the solutions that would recognize the disparate interests of the
directors is changing the meaning of the credits available to DGA members.
For example, as with directing teams, the DGA could modify its definition
of the “First Assistant Director” to mean the secondary creative director of a
film, in addition to or in lieu of the role’s managerial duties already codified
in the DGA Basic Agreement.143 Moreover, this new version of the first
assistant director can represent a specific creative element of filmmaking
(character development, storyline, expertise in adaptation from stage to film,
etc.). This way a director receives recognition for their creative contribution,
and this opens the door to all kinds of specialty attributions for directors.
Perhaps in these circumstances a disputing director would not mind
receiving the credit of the first assistant director instead.
Overall, these credit questions merit thorough discussion. The current
DGA negotiation is very one-sided, and leaves room only for the DGA to
make decisions based on what it hears from the opposing parties directly. In
recent years, directors have acted flexibly when approaching a problem that,
if escalated, would require the DGA to make a hard and fast decision. Some
directors, for example, Phil Lord, Chris Miller, and Ron Howard in the
making of Solo, came to a decision about credit on their own, without the
need for DGA intervention pursuant to its employment contract.144
With this background, it is this author’s opinion that mediation would
work best in deciding the credit disputes between directors after public
outcry over the original director and their past scandals. Parties in a joint
mediation would have the opportunity to discuss the reason for their demand
of screen credit, and where there is room for compromise. The DGA may
141. DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., DGA PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
COMPLAINTS, https://www.dga.org/News/Guild-News/2018/Mar2018/DGA-Procedures-for-HandlingSexual-Harassment-Complaints.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2021) (“If an allegation of sexual harassment
has been made against [a DGA member], and [their] employer wishes to interview [them], the Guild can
also represent [them]. Whether [they] need or have the right to representation depends on the facts of the
case”).
142. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 76.
143. DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., INC. BASIC AGREEMENT OF 2017, art.16 (2017),
https://www.dga.org/-/media/E912CA508ACF4446BA1C0DEB1B49ED89.pdf.
144. Id. at 98; Han Solo: The DGA Rule That Explains Lord and Miller’s Mid-Production Firing,
SCREEN RANT (July 29, 2017), https://screenrant.com/han-solo-lord-miller-firing-dga-rule/2/.
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balk at the idea of holding such a collaborative meeting; but, at the risk of
sounding corny, “get[ting] [the] parties out of an adversarial contest and into
the exercise of creating a better future” in fact awards directors with the
creative autonomy they fought for all those years ago when the DGA was
formed.145 The DGA modeled itself after medieval artisan guilds so
fellowship could flourish among its members.146 In this setting, the directors
here are not necessarily enemies of each other, but fellows of the same
organization that are facing a problem that goes to reputation and finances;
these problems do not automatically upend the overall “vision” of the film.
That said, should there be a dispute about vision, both parties in the
mediation should discuss their respective intentions with the film, the
similarities of those intentions, and how to move forward given the
differences.
The ability to craft a unique resolution to a dispute does not only benefit
the directors. The studio, for example, would likely propose to the fired
director that they publicly apologize for the misdeeds that led to the bad press
surrounding the movie.147 That way, the studio can save face by showing that
the director they initially hired is at least remorseful, and the studio can offer
something in return to the fired director. Other examples of results from such
a mediation would be changing the credits and their meanings after
renegotiating the DGA’s basic agreement. Like in the movie Solo’s credit
dispute, one product of a mediation could be that one director gets a different
credit that would be less noticeable to audiences.
The various interests connote a potentially long but comprehensive
mediation where all four parties are in attendance with the mediator, or
productive and shorter two rounds of mediation with the parties separated.
The problem with the latter setup is that faulty communication between the
two mediations could lead the parties to make incompatible decisions that
may require a third mediation. Therefore, the following discussion will
assume there is one mediation in which all four parties participate. However,
there should be some negotiated time constraints to the mediation that
recognizes the imminency of the film release date among other contractual
obligations.
One key component of this new form of mediation between directors is
the mediator themselves. Would this person be a director, in parallel with the
writer arbiters in WGA credit arbitrations? A producer? Some other craft
guild member with knowledge of directing, or a complete outsider? This is
a tricky question, and it does not help that directors are some of the most
well-known Hollywood elites in the world. Even though a mediator does not
have to be an expert within the field they mediate, having knowledge can
145. MENKEL-MEADOW, supra note 78, at 189.
146. WEXMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
147. MENKEL-MEADOW, supra note 78.
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assist the mediator in moving the conversation along, and perhaps
controversially, notifying the parties of the rights they have.148 One option is
to have retired foreign directors mediate disputes. If the mediator has retired
from the industry, they have no stakes in how the case goes. If the mediator
is from and made movies in a different country, they would potentially have
no close connection with the directors in dispute. For the studio and DGA, a
retired foreign director may not be familiar with their contracts and general
mode of operations. That said, there are some needs that are so universal that
even a retired foreign director would understand them (e.g., the need to have
a good reputation and financing).
One downside of the mediation is the inability to multitask. What the
process gains in clearing up communication and molding a creative solution
between disputing parties it loses in the time that directors, DGA employees,
and the studios have now between phone calls and emails in the DGA’s
casual negotiation procedure. The perfect mediation between directors, the
studios, and the DGA might not be within reach anytime soon, but a
discussion of the alternate dispute resolutions in these instances of scandal
could help develop the proper tools for future disputes like this.
For the sake of preserving both the integrity of the director, the interests
of competing directors, and the public at-large, it would be worthwhile to
experiment with these more formal alternate dispute resolutions to develop
a more just system in determining director credits.
V. CONCLUSION
Although credit disputes among directors are few and far between, their
growing complexities and ramifications indicate that a new procedure is
proper for disputes among DGA directors. For the DGA to remain unmoved
by changing times in the industry is ill-advised, detrimental to members and
others in the industry, and causes public backlash. By learning from
successful alternate dispute resolution methods utilized by other Hollywood
guilds and modifying those methods to meet the unique needs of directors,
the DGA may better address debates over credit going forward.

148. Id. at 227.

Spring 2022

CUT! . . . OUT OF CREDIT ARBITRATION

245

VI. SOURCES
BOOKS
BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL
SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron
S. Kesselheim eds., 2016).
CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL (3d ed. 2019).
CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND
MADISON AVENUE (2016).
EITHNE QUINN, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: RACE AND LABOR IN POSTCIVIL RIGHTS HOLLYWOOD (2020).
GLENN FRANKEL, HIGH NOON: THE HOLLYWOOD BLACKLIST AND
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CLASSIC (2017).
VIRGINIA WRIGHT WEXMAN, HOLLYWOOD’S ARTISTS: THE
DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP
(2020).
VOICES OF LABOR: CREATIVITY, CRAFT, AND CONFLICT IN GLOBAL
HOLLYWOOD (Michael Curtin & Kevin Sanson eds., 2017).
JOURNALS
Catherine L. Fisk, The Writer’s Share, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 621
(2017).
Michael L. Zimmer, Taking on An Industry: Women and Directing in
Hollywood, 20 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 229 (2016).
Who is a “Film by?” The Writers Guild vs The Directors Guild, THE
BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2019/01/who-is-a-filmby-the-writers-guild-vs-the-directors-guild/
Online Sources
Ariane Lange, “‘I’m Sorry’ Is Not Enough”: Inside The Union Trial Of
An Alleged Sexual Harasser, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 6, 2018),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/arianelange/chris-savino-animationguild-metoo-allegations-

246

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

44:2

nickelodeon#:~:text=Nickelodeon%20had%20fired%20Savino%20in,the%
20allegations%20to%20be%20forgotten.
ALLIANCE OF MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION PRODUCERS,
https://www.amptp.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
Americans and ‘Cancel Culture’: Where Some See Calls for
Accountability, Others See Censorship, Punishment, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May
19, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/05/19/americansand-cancel-culture-where-some-see-calls-for-accountability-others-seecensorship-punishment/.
Dave McNary, DGA Accused of Bias Against Female Directing Teams
by ‘Crazy Ex-Girlfriend’ Director, VARIETY (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://variety.com/2018/film/news/crazy-ex-girlfriend-director-dga1202987025/.
DGA TRAINING PROGRAM, https://www.dgatrainingprogram.org/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2022).
DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., INC. BASIC
AGREEMENT
OF
2017,
https://www.dga.org//media/E912CA508ACF4446BA1C0DEB1B49ED89.pdf.
DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM. CREATIVE
RIGHTS HANDBOOK 2017-2020.
DIRECTORS GUILD OF AM., DGA PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS, https://www.dga.org/News/GuildNews/2018/Mar2018/DGA-Procedures-for-Handling-Sexual-HarassmentComplaints.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
Farewell Letter from President Thomas Schlamme, DGA GUILD NEWS,
https://www.dga.org/News/GuildNews/2021/September2021/Schlamme_Farewell_Letter.aspx (last visited
Nov. 15, 2021).
Han Solo: The DGA Rule That Explains Lord and Miller’s MidProduction Firing, SCREEN RANT, https://screenrant.com/han-solo-lordmiller-firing-dga-rule/2/.
Mark Harrison, Whose Film is It Anyway? Unpicking Movies with
Multiple
Directors,
DEN
OF
GEEK
(Nov.
1,
2018),

Spring 2022

CUT! . . . OUT OF CREDIT ARBITRATION

247

https://www.denofgeek.com/movies/whose-film-is-it-anyway-unpickingmovies-with-multiple-directors/
Phil Lord and Chris Miller, Producers, SONY PICTURES ANIMATION,
https://www.sonypicturesanimation.com/our-team/filmmakers/phil-lordand-chris-miller (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
Phil McCausland, Filmmaker Morgan Spurlock admits to history of
sexual
misconduct,
NBC
NEWS
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/filmmakermorgan-spurlock-admits-history-sexual-misconduct-n829581.
PRODUCERS GUILD OF AM., RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCERS
MARK ELIGIBILITY – MOTION PICTURES
PRODUCERS CODE OF CREDITS
Ricardo Lopez, Warner Bros. Cuts Final Ties with Brett Ratner, Won’t
Renew $450-Million Co-Financing Deal, VARIETY (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://variety.com/2018/film/news/brett-ratner-warners-cofinancing-dealends-1202750809/.
What Is a Showrunner: Shonda Rhimes’s Advice for Showrunners,
MASTERCLASS
(Sept.
10,
2021),
https://www.masterclass.com/articles/what-is-a-showrunner-shondarhimess-advice-for-showrunners.
WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., CREDITS SURVIVAL GUIDE,
https://www.wga.org/contracts/credits/manuals/survival-guide.
WRITERS GUILD OF AM. W., WRITERS GUILD OF AM. 2017
THEATRICAL & TEL. BASIC AGREEMENT.
MAGAZINES
Gregg Kilday, Harvey Weinstein Resigns from Producers Guild of
America, Is Now Banned for Life, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Oct. 30, 2017.
Helen Lewis, How Capitalism Drives Cancel Culture, THE ATLANTIC,
July 14, 2020.
Jonathan Handel, #MeToo: Hollywood Guilds Grapple with How to
Represent the Accuser and the Accused, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Feb. 15,
2018.

248

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

44:2

Luke Winkie, Everything We Know (and Don’t) About the Averted
IATSE Strike, VULTURE, Oct. 28, 2021.
Neil Vigdor, Woody Allen and Amazon Settle Breach of Contract
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2019.
Paul Brownfield, Thomas Kail’s High-Wire Act, DGA QUARTERLY,
Summer 2019.
Stephanie Zacharek, We Can’t Talk About Bohemian Rhapsody Without
Talking About Bryan Singer, TIME, Jan. 7, 2019.
Ted Elrick, Singularity of Vision, DGA QUARTERLY, May 2004.
CASES
Ferguson v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 226 Cal.App.3d 1382 (1991).
Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., 992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir 1994).
INTERVIEWS
Interview by Madeline Giles with anonymous entertainment lawyer
(Oct. 24, 2021).
Interview by Madeline Giles with Lesley Mackey, Senior Director of
Credits of the WGA (Nov. 3, 2021).

